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Abstract 
We study the behavior of employers and employees in a gift exchange game and find that 
employers offer lower wages when there is the risk of losing money. This, however, does not 
lead to lower effort level choices. In fact, effort per wage unit is significantly higher in the 
treatment with potential employer losses. This result can be in line with social comparison 
theories that are based on relative payoff differences. Alternatively, this result is also in line 
with the hypothesis that the risk of losing money increases the credibility of the employer’s 
trust signal and, thus, the employee’s reciprocity. 
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1. Introduction 
The reciprocity (or “gift exchange”) phenomenon in labor relations (Akerlof 1982) has found 
strong experimental support both with real effort tasks (Fahr and Irlenbusch 2000; Brüggen 
and Strobel 2007) and without (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, Riedl 1993; Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold, 
Gächter 1998; Charness 2004). In these experiments, the employer can pay a wage above the 
minimum wage in the anticipation that the worker will reciprocate with an effort level that lies 
above the minimum effort. The principle finding in these studies is that a majority of the ex-
perimental employers trust their employees and pay relatively high wages. In response, most 
of the experimental employees reciprocate by choosing effort levels that positively correlate 
to the wages and are above the minimum effort level. As a consequence of trust and reciproci-
ty, the efficiency in these “fair wage” (or “efficiency wage”) partnerships is much higher than 
in the non-cooperative equilibrium of the game with rational money-maximizing agents. 
So far, however, experimental research on fair wages has not taken into account the effect of 
potential losses for the employers. In this paper, we compare an employment setting without 
losses to one in which the employer may incur a financial loss if the wage is high enough and 
the work effort chosen by the employee is low enough. We find support for the hypothesis 
that losses affect the effort provision per wage unit, leading to a significantly higher produc-
tivity with potential losses than without. This, we conjecture, indicates that employees take 
the risk of losing money that employers face into account when assessing the fairness of wage 
offers and deciding on their effort choices. The observed employee behavior is in line with the 
models of social comparison that take relative payoff differences into account (e.g. Bolton and 
Ockenfels 2000), but not with those concerned with absolute payoff differences. The observed 
employer behavior, however, is in line with neither of the models.  
2. Related Literature 
Most experimental studies of labor relations are based on the game originally suggested by 
Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993) and the related “bilateral gift exchange game” presented 
by Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold, and Gächter (1998). In these games, the wage is deducted from 
the employer’s endowment before the employee chooses an effort level and the production 
begins. Since the production is modeled as a multiplication of effort times what is left of the 
endowment, the employer’s income can never be negative.  
Some of the newer studies (e.g. Brown, Falk, and Fehr 2004; Maximiano, Sloof, and Sonne-
mans 2007) adopt a different model, in which employers may incur a financial loss, because 
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the wage is deducted from the firm’s output after the effort is chosen and the production is 
completed.1 The focus of these papers, however, is not to identify the effect of potential losses 
on the labor relationship. To do so, two (almost) identical settings must be compared that only 
differ on whether employers face losses or not. To our knowledge, such a comparison cannot 
be found in the literature so far.2 
3. Experimental design 
In our two-player sequential moves games, the employer first makes a wage offer. If the em-
ployee rejects, both receive nothing. In case the offer is accepted, the employee chooses an 
effort level e with a strictly increasing cost c(e). 
In the version LOSS the employer’s payoff is: wevLOSSEmployer  10/ , where v represents the 
endowment of the employer and w the wage offer (between zero and v). In the version NO 
LOSS the employer’s payoff is 9010/   wevLOSSNOEmployer  
The added lump sum of 90 is high enough to cover any possible loss for the employer in NO 
LOSS.  
The employee’s payoffs are: )e(cw LOSSEmployee  and  90)e(cw LOSSNOEmployee   
Effort e is bounded between 10 and 100, with an exponentially increasing cost. We employ 
the same cost table as the previous studies cited above. 
Table 1. Cost of effort. 
effort e 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
effort cost c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
 
In both treatments, we set v=100. Thus, in LOSS, the worst possible outcome for the employer 
is –90, while it is 0 in NO LOSS. We neutralized the income effect across treatments by using 
                                                          
1 In this model, the effort does not have a decreasing marginal product in the upper wage ranges and the joint 
payoff is not an increasing function of the wage. 
2 Dittrich and Ziegelmeyer (2010) provide a comparison of the classical model (Fehr et al. 1998) with the model 
including potential employer losses (Brown et al. 2004). The focus of their study, however, is to show that fair-
ness concerns evoke different behavior in the two settings. Since they show that behavior in the two models may 
diverge due to fairness considerations (based on Fehr and Schmidt 1999), a comparison of these two settings 
cannot identify the effect of employer losses that we study. 
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different exchange rates. The subjects on average earned Euro 11 (i.e. about $15 at that time) 
for the one hour experiment. Overall 56 subjects played in randomly matched fixed pairs. We 
have 14 independent observations per treatment. The subjects were randomly assigned to their 
roles and played all ten periods in the same role. The communication was computerized using 
zTree (Fischbacher 2007). Instructions were administered to subjects in their cubicles and 
read aloud.   
4. Results 
Figure 1 displays the distribution of wage offers. While the distribution of low wages seems 
similar in both treatments, there are substantially higher wage offers in NO LOSS than in 
LOSS. Figure 2 displays the average effort for the ten possible wage intervals. Standard theory 
predicts that employees will choose the lowest possible effort level for any wage. But, as in 
previous laboratory studies, we also observe effort levels well above the minimum effort that 
are increasing in wages.3 
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Figure 1. Average wage offers over wage intervals. 
 
                                                          
3 The spearman rank correlation coefficients relating mean efforts to mean wages in both treatments are positive 
and significantly different from zero: LOSS: r = 0.876 (p = 0.000 one-tailed) and NO LOSS: r = 0.865 (p = 0.000 
one-tailed). 
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Figure 2. Average effort over wage intervals. 
 
Figure 2 also shows that the effort per wage unit in LOSS is greater than in NO LOSS (U-Test, 
p=0.011, one-tailed). This suggests that employee behavior is in contradiction with social 
comparison theories based on absolute payoff differences, because the payoff differences are 
identical in the two treatments. Social comparison theories based on relative payoff differenc-
es predict lower effort levels in NO LOSS than in LOSS. The regressions below support this 
statement.  
Table 2 presents the results of two panel regressions. In the first regression wage is a function 
of last period’s effort and a treatment dummy. Because wages were restricted, we use a ran-
dom effects two-sided Tobit model and find the coefficients for both parameters to be positive 
and highly significant. Hence, employers reciprocate to past effort choices and react positive-
ly to the NO LOSS treatment when making wage offers. The second regression studies the 
impact of wage offers and the treatment dummy on effort choices. We find a significantly 
positive effect of wages on effort and a significantly negative effect of the treatment.  
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Table 2. Regression results. 
Random-effects, two-sided Tobit regression with wage as dependent variable. Wald 2=85.58; p=0.00 
independent variable coefficient standard error Z   ZP   
Constant 20.50886 3.159835 6.49 0.000 
lagged effort 0.3441423 0.0385123 8.94 0.000 
Treatment 7.018887 2.495742 2.81 0.005 
 
Random-effects, two-sided Tobit regression with effort as dependent variable. Wald 2=153.44; p=0.00 
independent variable coefficient standard error Z   ZP   
Constant -13.91906 8.081943 -1.72 0.085 
Wage 1.793974 0.1452507 12.35 0.000 
Treatment -14.65857 5.76667 -2.54 0.011 
 
4. Conclusions 
We compare two versions of the gift-exchange game in the laboratory. In the LOSS setting, 
employers face the risk of negative payoffs, while they do not in the NO LOSS setting. Our 
experiment shows that wage offers are higher when employers do not face the risk of incur-
ring losses. This result is neither in line with social comparison theories that are based on ab-
solute payoff differences nor on relative payoff differences. The result, however, is in line 
with the assumption that employers behave loss averse. Furthermore, we find that the em-
ployer’s risk of losing money has a positive effect on the employee’s effort choices. This re-
sult can be in line with social comparison theories that are based on relative payoff differences 
(e.g. Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). Alternatively, this result is also in line with the hypothesis 
that the risk of losing money increases the credibility of the employer’s trust in the em-
ployee’s reciprocity, as signaled by the wage.  
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In conclusion, our results indicate that the risk of losing money must be taken into considera-
tion when employer-employee relationships are studied. The shadow of losses looms over the 
relationship, enhancing the employee’s willingness to increase productivity by exerting a 
higher effort per wage unit.  
Our results may also shed some light on the question why employees in small and medium 
sized enterprises exert more effort than employees in comparable positions in large enterpris-
es. Since the risk of incurring losses is generally greater in smaller firms, fair wage payments 
in these firms may be perceived as stronger trust signals by the employees, who then recipro-
cate with relatively high effort level choices. To pursue this hypothesis further, more empiri-
cal research and firm level data will be necessary on the link between human resource produc-
tivity and operative risk. 
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